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Abstract
It is di¢ cult to resolve the global warming free-rider externality problem by nego-
tiating n di⁄erent quantity targets. By contrast, negotiating a single internationally-
binding minimum carbon price (the proceeds from which are domestically retained)
counters self interest by incentivizing agents to internalize the externality. The model
of this paper indicates an exact sense in which each agent￿ s extra cost from a higher
emissions price is counter-balanced by that agent￿ s extra bene￿t from inducing all other
agents to simultaneously lower their emissions in response to the higher price. Some
implications are discussed. While the paper is centered on a formal model, the tone
of the policy discussion resembles more an exploratory think piece.
1 Introduction: Negotiating Prices vs. Quantities
Throughout this paper I use the terms ￿climate change￿and ￿global warming￿interchange-
ably. The term ￿climate change￿ is currently in vogue and is perhaps a more apt de-
scription overall. But the term ￿global warming￿is more evocative of this paper￿ s main
theme. Global warming is a global public-goods externality whose resolution requires an
unprecedented degree of international cooperation and coordination. This international
climate-change externality has been characterized as the most di¢ cult public goods problem
that humanity has ever faced. I concentrate in this paper on carbon dioxide emissions, but
in principle the discussion could be extended to emissions of all relevant greenhouse gases.
￿Department of Economics, Harvard University (mweitzman@harvard.edu). For useful constructive com-
ments, but without necessarily implicating them in the conclusions of this paper, I would like to thank Frank
Ackerman, Joseph Aldy, Geir Asheim, Daniel Bodansky, Dallas Burtraw, Daniel Cole, Stephen DeCanio,
Denny Ellerman, Bard Harstad, Gary Libecap, Gilbert Metcalf, Juan Moreno-Cruz, Ian Parry, Robert
Pindyck, Thomas Schelling, Richard Schmalensee, Robert Stavins, and David Weisbach.
1An internationally harmonized but nationally retained carbon tax has already been pro-
posed as a solution to the global warming externality, and has been examined on its merits.1
In what follows I very brie￿ y summarize some of the possible virtues of an internationally-
harmonized nationally-collected carbon tax that have been noted in the literature. My foil
here is an internationally harmonized cap-and-trade system. This kind of global-design
comparison is complicated and full of subjective judgements about what might or might not
work better in practice and why or why not. My purpose here is merely to indicate that a
carbon tax already has some signi￿cant arguments in its favor ￿as a prelude to some new
theoretical arguments for negotiating a uniform price on carbon that I will later develop in
this paper.
Both quantity-based and price-based controls are inherently uncertain for the period
during which they apply (in between times of periodic review), but the uncertainty takes
di⁄erent forms. With cap-and-trade, total emissions are known but the price is uncertain.
With a carbon tax, the price of carbon emissions is known, but total emissions are uncertain.
On the basis of economic models of climate change that include uncertainty, carbon taxes
outperform tradeable permits, both empirically and theoretically.2 In the real world, I think
that energy price volatility is very poorly tolerated by the general public. Swings in carbon
prices, especially in extreme cases, could sour the public and discredit for some time the
entire idea of a market-based approach to the climate change problem. On the other hand,
it is di¢ cult for me to imagine the broad public getting quite so upset because total emissions
￿ uctuate.
It has been argued, I think convincingly, that a carbon tax is more easily administered and
more transparent than a cap-and-trade system. This consideration is especially important
in a comprehensive international context that would include all major emitting countries.
Under international cap-and-trade, governments will allocate valuable emissions permits to
their nation￿ s ￿rms and residents. In some places under some circumstances there may be a
great temptation for kleptocrats to steal these valuable emissions permits and sell them on
the international market.
The revenues from an internationally harmonized carbon tax are retained internally
within each nation, and could be used, for example, to o⁄set other taxes. This, I think, is a
desirable property. By contrast the revenues generated from an internationally harmonized
cap-and-trade system ￿ ow as visible external transfer payments across national borders,
1There is actually a fair-sized literature on a carbon-tax (or carbon-price) approach. See, e.g., Cooper
(2010), Metcalf and Weisbach (2009), Nordhaus (2007, 2013), and the many further references cited therein.
Cramton, Ockenfels and Stoft (2013) contains an informal argument in favor of internationally harmonized
carbon prices that parallels the argument here, but without the formal analysis of this paper.
2See Hoel and Karp (2002), Pizer (1999), and Weitzman (1974).
2which might be less easily tolerated by nations required to pay other nations large sums of
taxpayer-￿nanced money to buy permits.
This extremely brief discussion of the advantages of an internationally harmonized carbon
tax (compared to cap-and-trade) is not intended to be comprehensive. There are also some
legitimate arguments in favor of internationally harmonized tradeable permits and against a
carbon tax.3 Both approaches are subject to immense ￿sometimes seemingly overwhelming
￿criticisms. In both cases there are innumerable practical details that must be worked out.
In both cases an e⁄ective international treaty needs to be binding, which raises uncomfortable
issues of enforcement mechanisms and international sanctions. Additionally, there might be
mixed hybrid systems. I merely want to establish a starting position where the idea of an
internationally harmonized carbon tax already commands some intellectual respect.
The Kyoto approach to global warming was inspired by the ultimate vision of a top-down
worldwide treaty limiting the output of each nation￿ s carbon dioxide emissions. It had been
wishfully hoped that the highly incomplete Kyoto quantity assignments might have grown
into a comprehensive binding system of national emissions caps. If these comprehensive
caps were freely traded internationally as emissions permits, it would have caused there to
be one uniform worldwide price of carbon emissions, thereby guaranteeing cost e⁄ectiveness.
As events played out, Kyoto did not come close to its inspirational vision of an inter-
nationally harmonized binding system of emissions caps. By now, the quantity-based
Kyoto-type approach has pretty much broken down, leaving the world with a highly non-
optimal patchwork of sporadic regional volunteerism that does not address centrally how to
correct the critical externality of global warming.
In this paper I argue that it is very di¢ cult to resolve the global warming externality
problem by assigning quantity targets. With n di⁄erent national entities, a meaningful
comprehensive quantity-based treaty involves specifying n di⁄erent binding emissions quotas
(whether in the form of tradeable permits or not). Each nation has a self-interested incentive
to negotiate for itself a low cap on carbon emissions ￿much lower than would be socially
optimal. The resulting free-rider problem plagues a quantity-based approach. Even if
there were a collective commitment to negotiate or vote on a second-stage worldwide total
emissions cap, disagreements over the ￿rst-stage subdivision formula (for disaggregating an
aggregate worldwide cap into n national quantity targets) would paralyze such a quantity-
based approach.
One point should perhaps be emphasized above all others at the outset. The global
warming externality problem cannot be resolved without a binding agreement on some overall
3For a critical review of carbon taxes vs. cap-and-trade, see Goulder and Schein (2013) and the further
references they cite.
3formula for dividing emissions responsibilities among nations. Volunteer altruism alone
will not solve this international public-goods problem. Of necessity there must be some
impingement on national sovereignty. The question for this paper then becomes: Which
collective-commitment frameworks and formulas are more doable than which others?
2 Theory of Negotiating a Uniform Carbon Price
In this paper I examine the theoretical properties of a natural one-dimensional focus on nego-
tiating a single binding price on carbon emissions, the proceeds from which are domestically
retained. For simplicity, I identify this single binding price on carbon as if it is a harmonized
carbon tax. At a theoretical level of abstraction, I blur the distinction between a carbon
price and a carbon tax. However, in actuality the important thing is acquiescence by each
nation to a binding minimum price on carbon emissions, not the particular mechanism by
which this binding minimum price is attained by a particular nation.4 I elaborate further
on this issue in my concluding remarks.
At a theoretical level, I would suggest that the instruments of negotiation for helping to
resolve the global warming externality should ideally possess three desirable properties.
1. Induce cost e⁄ectiveness.
2. Be of one dimension centered on a ￿natural￿focal point to facilitate ￿nding an agree-
ment with relatively low transactions costs.
3. Embody ￿countervailing force￿against narrow self interest by automatically incentiviz-
ing all negotiating parties to internalize the externality.
Using these three desirable theoretical properties as criteria, I now compare and contrast
an idealized binding harmonized price with an idealized binding cap-and-trade system.
On the ￿rst desirable property, in principle both a carbon price and tradeable permits
achieve cost e⁄ectiveness (provided agreement can be had in the ￿rst place).
The second desirable property (low dimensionality) argues in favor of a one-dimensional
harmonized carbon price over a n-dimensional harmonized cap-and-trade system. Alas, this
argument is elusively di¢ cult to formulate rigorously, or even to articulate coherently. My
argument here is necessarily intuitive or behavioral and relies on empirical counter-examples.
In this case a primary empirical counter-example is the breakdown of the quantity-based
Kyoto approach.
4A system of uniform national carbon taxes with revenues kept in the taxing country is a relatively simple
and transparent way to achieve harmonized carbon prices. But it is not necessary for the conclusions of this
paper. Nations or regions could meet the obligation of a minimum price on carbon emissions by whatever
internal mechanism they choose ￿a tax, a cap-and-trade system, a hybrid system, or whatever else results
in an observable price of carbon.
4With n di⁄erent national entities, a quantity-based treaty involves assigning n di⁄erent
binding emissions quotas (whether tradeable or not). Quantity-based treaty making can be
viewed as a coordination game with n di⁄erent players. Such a game can have multiple
solutions, often depending delicately on the setup and what is being assumed. In the case
of Kyoto, the world has in practice arrived at a bad solution that has essentially devolved
to regional volunteerism.
Thomas Schelling introduced and popularized the notion of a focal point in game theory.5
Generally speaking, a focal point of a n-party coordination game is some salient feature
that reduces the dimensionality of the problem and simpli￿es the negotiations by limiting
bargaining to some manageable subset, hopefully of one dimension. The basic idea is
that by limiting bargaining to a salient focus, there may be more hope of reaching a good
solution. In a somewhat circular de￿nition, a focal point is anything that provides a focus
of convergence. The ￿naturalness￿or ￿salience￿of a focal point is an important aspect of
Schelling￿ s argument that is di¢ cult to de￿ne rigorously and is ultimately intuitive.
The concept of ￿transactions cost￿is associated with the work of Ronald Coase.6 The
basic idea is that n parties to a negotiation can be prevented from attaining a socially
desirable outcome by the costs of transacting the agreement among themselves. One could
try to argue that, other things being equal, transactions costs increase at least proportionally
with the number of parties n.
In the case of international negotiations on climate change, I believe that both Schelling￿ s
concept of a salient focal point and Coase￿ s concept of transactions costs can be used as
informal arguments to support negotiating a single harmonized carbon price whose proceeds
are nationally rebated. Put directly, it is easier to negotiate one price than n quantities
￿especially when the one price can be interpreted as ￿fair￿in terms of equality of e⁄ort.
I cannot defend this claim rigorously. At the end of the day, this is more of a plausible
conjecture than a rigorous theorem. Whether justly or not, throughout this paper I basically
assume that the essential contrast is between one binding price assignment versus n binding
quantity assignments ￿and I then proceed to examine the consequences.
The third desirable property is that the instrument or instruments of negotiation should
embody ￿countervailing force￿against narrow free-riding self interest by incorporating incen-
tives that automatically internalize the externality. I believe this third property is arguably
5Schelling (1960). See also the special 2006 issue of the Journal of Economic Psychology devoted to
Schelling￿ s psychological decision theory, especially the introduction by Colman (2006). Three of the seven
articles in this issue concerned aspects of focal points, testifying to the lasting in￿ uence of the concept.
6Coase himself did not invent or even use the term ￿transactions cost￿but he prominently employed the
concept. See Coase (1960). For an application of the transactions cost approach to controlling greenhouse
gas emissions, see Libecap (2013).
5the most important property of all. This ￿countervailing force￿property is inherently built
into a price-based harmonized system of emissions charges, but it is absent from a quantity-
based international cap-and-trade system, at least as traditionally formulated.
If I am assigned a cap on emissions, then it is in my own narrow free-riding self interest
to want my cap to be as large as possible (whether or not my cap will be tradeable as a
permit). The self-interested part of me wants maximal leniency for myself. Other than
altruism, there is no countervailing force on the other side encouraging me to lower my
desired emissions cap because of the externality bene￿ts I will be bestowing on others.
Within a nation, the government assigns binding caps. But among sovereign nations,
binding caps must be negotiated. I believe that this is a crucial distinction for the success
or failure of a cap-and-trade regime. A Kyoto-type quantity-based international system
fails because no one has an incentive to internalize the externality and everyone has the self-
interested incentive to free ride. What remains is essentially an erratic pattern of altruistic
individual volunteerism that is far from a socially optimal resolution of the problem.
A internationally-harmonized domestically-collected carbon price is di⁄erent. If the
price were imposed on me alone, I would wish it to be as low as possible so as to limit my
abatement costs. But when the price is uniformly imposed, it embodies a countervailing
force that internalizes the externality for me. Countervailing my desire for the price to
be low (in order to limit my abatement costs) is my desire for the price to be high so that
other nations will restrict their emissions, thereby increasing my bene￿t from worldwide total
carbon abatement. A binding uniform price of carbon emissions has a built-in self-enforcing
mechanism that countervails free riding.7
The remainder of the paper concentrates mostly on analyzing this third ￿countervailing
force￿property of an internationally-harmonized but nationally-collected carbon price. I
construct a basic model indicating the exact sense in which each agent￿ s extra cost from a
higher international emissions price is counter-balanced by that agent￿ s extra bene￿t from
inducing all other agents to simultaneously lower their emissions via the higher international
price.
With further restrictions, the model shows that population-weighted majority rule for an
internationally harmonized carbon price can come as close to an optimal price on emissions
as the median per-capita marginal bene￿t is close to the mean per-capita marginal bene￿t.
7Later I discuss negotiating one worldwide aggregate emissions cap (contingent upon a previous-round
subdivision formula for n fractional targets, set, for example, by a preceding agreement on various target
reductions from various baselines). A system based on negotiating aggregate emissions (given a subdivision
formula) could, in principle, embody countervailing force against the global warming externality. But,
again, I will conclude that negotiating the extra layer of n ￿rst-round Kyoto-like fractional subdivision
target reductions will likely founder politically when applied on a worldwide scale.
6The key insight from this way of looking at things is that in voting (or more generally
negotiating) a universal carbon price, various nations are, to a greater or lesser degree,
internalizing the externality. Loosely speaking, an ￿average￿nation is fully internalizing
the externality because its extra cost from a higher emissions price is exactly o⁄set by its
extra bene￿t from inducing all other nations to simultaneously lower their emissions via the
higher price.
On the price side, a uniform carbon price automatically has the desirable property that
cost e⁄ectiveness is guaranteed. I think that the formal voting result of the model of this
paper might perhaps be interpreted somewhat less formally as indicating that negotiating an
internationally harmonized (but nationally collected) carbon price may have an important
desirable property on the quantity side as well. If the median marginal bene￿t (per capita)
equals the mean marginal bene￿t (per capita), then the socially optimal carbon price has
the property that, roughly speaking, half of the world￿ s population wants the price to be
higher, while the other half of the world￿ s population wants the price to be lower. In
this situation, the desirable quantity-side property is that the total worldwide output of all
emissions might be ￿close￿to being optimal to the extent that the outcome of negotiations
mimics the outcome of majority voting. Although the real world is a far more complicated
and nuanced place than the restrictive theoretical model of this paper, I think this voting
result is trying to indicate something positive (even if only at an abstract level) about how
a negotiated uniform carbon price might possess some overall potential to counteract via
internalization the externality of global warming.
3 The Model
The formulation here is at a heroic level of abstraction. I wave away innumerable ￿practical￿
considerations to focus on a theoretical model. I beg the reader￿ s indulgence for a willing
suspension of disbelief while the basic argument is being developed.
The analysis is made cleanest and most transparent when the fundamental unit is the
person, so that everything is normalized per capita. In reality, of course, people belong to
some larger entity, here called a ￿nation,￿that (hopefully or presumably) acts on their behalf
with respect to carbon price negotiations, enforcement, and revenue recycling. The nation
here is an elastic concept, since for the purposes of this paper it might be more appropriate
to consider regional blocs like the European Union as if it comprised a single nation. It is
easiest to conceptualize that all of the people belonging to one nation are identical agents
whose tastes and technology are representative of that nation. For an individual belonging
to a nation everything ￿emissions, costs, bene￿ts ￿is expressed in per-capita terms for that
7nation. (Inversely, one could take costs and bene￿ts on the national level as given primitives
and impute to each citizen the corresponding per-capita costs and bene￿ts as a function of
per-capita emissions, being careful to ensure that the imputed per-capita costs and bene￿ts
aggregate consistently to the given national costs and bene￿ts.)
The nation here is e⁄ectively an entity that enforces the imposition of an internationally
harmonized carbon price and recycles internally the domestic revenues raised by the tax-like
price. I assume that this recycling is e¢ cient, as if by lump sum internal transfers, so there
is no net national loss from the internally-imposed carbon price per se. Additionally, when
it comes to voting or negotiating a carbon price for some particular time period, the nation
e⁄ectively votes or negotiates on behalf of its citizens in accordance with their preferences.
These assumptions are vulnerable, but they may make sense as an abstraction and can serve
as a point of departure for further discussion.
The total world population is m. Each person is indexed by i = 1;2;:::;m. In what
follows I abstract away from dynamics in favor of a static-￿ ow analysis. I assume agents
can convert their wishes about desired stock levels into wishes about corresponding ￿ ows for
the period under consideration.
Let Xi stand for the level of carbon abatement of person i (from some predetermined
level). The cost of attaining abatement level Xi for person i is given by the function
Ci(Xi). If the internationally harmonized price on carbon emissions is p, then the response
of individual i is Xi(p), where, for each i = 1;2;:::m,
C
0
i(Xi(p)) = p: (1)
Condition (1) guarantees worldwide cost e⁄ectiveness. The total worldwide abatement
level corresponding to (1) is
X(p) =
m X
i=1
Xi(p): (2)
The bene￿t of worldwide abatement level X for person i is given by the bene￿t function
Bi(X). The worldwide socially optimal level of an internationally harmonized emissions
price is the value p￿ that obeys the classic Samuelson public goods optimality condition,
which here can be written as
p
￿ =
m X
i=1
B
0
i(X(p
￿)): (3)
Consider next what is the optimal level of an internationally harmonized carbon price
from the narrow perspective of person i. Because revenues from the carbon price are collected
and recycled by the nation to which i belongs, there is no tax burden per se. (The only
8real burden to i here is the cost Ci incurred by obeying condition (1)). The emissions-price
level pi that i would most prefer solves the problem
max
p fBi(X(p)) ￿ Ci(Xi(p))g; (4)
which satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition
B
0
i(X(pi))X
0(pi) = C
0
i(Xi(pi))X
0
i(pi): (5)
Use condition (1) to rewrite (5) as
pi = C
0
i(Xi(pi)) = ￿i B
0
i(X(pi)); (6)
where
￿i ￿
X0(pi)
X0
i(pi)
=
dX
dXi
(7)
might be called the externality-internalizing multiplier (for agent i).
Note from (6) what agent i is not doing here. Agent i is not equating its marginal cost
of abatement C0
i to the narrow marginal bene￿t from one more unit of its own abatement B0
i,
which would be the analogue here to the condition for voluntary provision of public goods,
and which would result in a free-riding too-low provision of the public good. Instead, the
narrow marginal bene￿t B0
i is being magni￿ed in (6) by a factor of ￿i, so that agent i is
equating its marginal cost C0
i to ￿i B0
i (instead of to B0
i).
What is the value of the externality-internalizing multiplier ￿i? To strengthen intuition,
consider ￿rst the extreme case where all agents i have identical cost and bene￿t functions.
Then ￿i = m, while Xi = X=m and pi = p, so that (6) becomes
p = C
0
i(Xi) = mB
0
i(X) (8)
for all i, which is exactly the classic Samuelson condition for public goods optimality with m
identical agents. In this case of extreme symmetry, the externalty-internalizing multiplier
￿ is world population m.
In the more general case, by (7) the multiplier ￿i is the ratio of the change in total
global marginal abatement dX divided by the change in agent i￿ s marginal abatement dXi.
Equation (6) (along with de￿nition (7)) signi￿es that agent i is internalizing the externality
that it is causing by applying a multiplier that scales up the e⁄ect of its narrow marginal
bene￿t by however many times greater is the world￿ s marginal abatement response (to a price
change) than i￿ s own marginal abatement response (to a price change). E⁄ectively, agent i is
9induced to scale up its own narrow marginal bene￿t to a kind of golden-rule-like imputation
of the corresponding worldwide marginal bene￿t. But this is just the kind of golden-rule-like
scaling-up property that we would want an externality-internalizing multiplier to possess.
While it is simple, equation (6) (along with de￿nition (7)) is a fundamental result of this
paper. It conveys an exact sense in which an internationally-harmonized but nationally-
retained carbon price is internalizing the global warming externality. Again, the basic idea
is that each agent￿ s extra cost from a higher uniform emissions price is counter-balanced
by that same agent￿ s extra bene￿t from inducing all other agents to simultaneously lower
their emissions. This critical counter-balancing incentive is transmitted via the externality-
internalizing multiplier.
One might try, heuristically, to make a more general statement than (8) about an ￿av-
erage￿agent being close to optimal along vaguely similar lines. Loosely speaking, if i￿ is an
￿average￿citizen of the world (in a sense yet to be de￿ned), one might be tempted to allow
the approximation ￿i￿ (=X0(pi￿)=X0
i￿(pi￿)) ￿ m. Speaking even more loosely, one might
be further tempted to envision, for this ￿average￿citizen of the world i￿, that B0
i￿(X(pi￿))
is an ￿average￿value of all fB0
i(X(pi￿))g. Having come this far, the ultimate temptation is
to reason super-loosely that pi￿ from (6) then might not be a terrible approximation for p￿
from (3). Such an argument is heuristic and crude, to put it mildly. To make this kind
of an argument about an ￿average￿agent more precise requires placing considerably more
structure on the cost and bene￿t functions.
4 Some Further Simplifying Assumptions
The formulation in the last section gives some useful broad insights about the externality-
internalizing multiplier, but expression (6) (along with de￿nition (7)) is too general to yield
tractable analytical solutions. I proceed to get sharper closed-form expressions by con-
sidering families of linear marginal cost functions and linear marginal bene￿t functions, all
members of which are restricted to having identical slopes, but each member of which can
have a di⁄erent intercept representing di⁄ering values of an individual shift parameter. This
is the simplest formulation that allows costs and bene￿ts to be di⁄erent yet delivers analyt-
ically tractable results.
Without further apologizing, I assume for all persons i = 1;2;:::;m that marginal costs
are restricted to be of the particular linear form
C
0
i(Xi) = ci + ￿Xi: (9)
10The simpli￿cation (9) corresponds to a family of linear supply schedules having the same
slope ￿ that are shifted up or down (or right or left) to various degrees for various di⁄erent
individuals. Condition (9) means that marginal costs are linearly symmetric in such a way
that the coe¢ cient ci gives an unambiguous ranking of marginal costs for any arbitrarily-
given common level of abatement. Everyone has an individually shifted version of the same
underlying linear schedule of marginal cost (or linear supply schedule). Henceforth we can
identify the marginal cost schedule of person i as being represented by ci (given the common
value of ￿).
Also without further apologies, it is assumed for all persons i that marginal bene￿ts are
restricted to be of the particular linear form
B
0
i(X) = bi ￿ ￿X: (10)
Here the simpli￿cation (10) corresponds to a family of linear demand curves having the
same slope -￿ that are shifted up or down (or right or left) to various degrees for various
di⁄erent individuals. Condition (10) means that marginal bene￿ts are linearly symmetric
in such a way that the coe¢ cient bi gives an unambiguous ranking of marginal bene￿ts for
any arbitrarily-given level of total abatement. Everyone has an individually shifted version
of the same underlying linear schedule of marginal bene￿t (or linear demand schedule). In
this sense we can henceforth identify the marginal bene￿t schedule of person i as being
represented by bi (given the common value of ￿).
Without speci￿cations amounting to shifted linear supply schedules and shifted linear
demand schedules, it is very di¢ cult to obtain neat results. I think that the formulation of
this section may be all right as a base case or point of departure. The next section obtains
some strong insights that can emerge from assuming (9) and (10).
5 A Majority-Rule Result
Plugging (9) into (1) yields
ci + ￿Xi(p) = p; (11)
which can be inversely solved to obtain the relevant response function
Xi(p) =
p ￿ ci
￿
: (12)
11Combining (12) with (2) gives
X(p) =
mp ￿
P
ci
￿
: (13)
To obtain the socially optimal p￿, plug (13) and (10) into (3), which turns (3) into the
equation
p
￿ =
X
bi ￿ m￿
￿
mp￿ ￿
P
ci
￿
￿
: (14)
Finally, inversely solve equation (14) for p￿, which can then be expressed in the form
p
￿ = kb + k
0; (15)
where
b ￿
P
bi
m
; (16)
while
k ￿
m￿
￿ + m2￿
; (17)
and
k
0 ￿
m￿
P
ci
￿ + m2￿
: (18)
To obtain the individually optimal pi, ￿rst note from (13) and (12) that
X0(pi)
X0
i(pi)
= m: (19)
Then substitute (19), (13), (10) into (6), which turns the latter expression into
pi =
￿
bi ￿ ￿
￿
mpi ￿
P
ci
￿
￿￿
m: (20)
Finally, inversely solve equation (20) for pi, which can then be expressed in the form
pi = kbi + k
0; (21)
where, as before, k is de￿ned by (16) and k0 is de￿ned by (17).
Equation (21) means that the ordering of preferred carbon prices is the same as the
ordering of marginal bene￿ts. In this particular linear setup, it turns out that marginal
costs fcig are internalized and do not play a role in the comparative ranking of preferred
carbon prices (because k is independent of costs), although they do play a role in the absolute
12level of preferred carbon prices (via their aggregate in￿ uence on k0).
Note the tight correspondence between (21) and (15). To explore this correspondence
further, imagine the following hypothetical thought experiment.
Waving aside how it came into existence, suppose there is a World Climate Assembly
(WCA). The WCA votes on pairwise alternatives for the desired level of a universal carbon
price, based on the principle of one-person one-vote. In practice, this means that nations
vote for their desired level of a universal carbon price on behalf of their citizen constituents,
but the votes are weighted by each nation￿ s population.
What is the justi￿cation for a new international organization like the WCA? The ul-
timate justi￿cation is that new big problems may require new big solutions. For a world
desperately wanting new solutions to the important externality of climate change, perhaps it
is at least worth considering establishing a new organization along the lines of WCA. After
all, it is useful to have some concrete fallback decision mechanism behind vague ￿negoti-
ations￿because even with the focus on a one-dimensional harmonized carbon price there
are bound to be disagreements, whose resolution is unclear. I merely assume that it is in
the interest of enough nations to forfeit their rights to pollute in favor of a WCA solution
of the global warming externality. This is truly a heroic assumption at the present time
because the WCA does not correspond to any currently-existing international body. Taken
less literally, the thought experiment of a hypothetical WCA can still help us to concentrate
our thinking and intuition on what negotiations should be trying to accomplish.
One might object that a ￿consensus￿voting rule, not a majority voting rule, is employed
in negotiations under the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. This ￿consensus￿
voting rule has been widely interpreted as requiring near-unanimity. With such a restrictive
voting rule, signi￿cant progress on resolving the global warming externality is virtually im-
possible. Surely, a less restrictive voting rule, such as majority rule, would render progress
more likely. This paper in general, and this section in particular, examines the implications
of combining a majority voting rule with a collective commitment to negotiate (and, with
more information, renegotiate) a uniform carbon price. The outcome is surprisingly positive.
With pairwise majority voting on the preferred value of p, by the median voter theorem
the equilibrium outcome will be the median value of fpig, here denoted b p. Let b b denote the
median value of fbig. Then by (21), the majority-preferred equilibrium value of p is the
value b p satisfying
b p = kb b + k
0: (22)
Compare (22) with (15). The majority-rule carbon price b p is close to the optimal carbon
price p￿ when the median marginal bene￿t b b is close to the mean marginal bene￿t b. This
is as good a result as one might hope for from a voting solution. The mean and the median
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whether the mean marginal bene￿t of abatement per capita should be greater or less than
the median marginal bene￿t of abatement per capita. If the two are equal, then majority
voting obtains the optimal solution. If the two are unequal, the analysis provides a measure
of how far away from optimality is majority rule. Of course this is just a model with quite
restrictive assumptions, but in a post-Kyoto world of stalemated negotiations I ￿nd attractive
the image of a WCA-style population-weighted median carbon price as being a useful point
of departure that holds out some prospect of coming ￿close enough￿to an optimal solution.
This is about as far as theory can take us. When the model is tightly structured with
the speci￿cations and assumptions applying to this section of the paper, the main result
here indicates an exact sense in which majority rule for a harmonized national carbon price
can come close to fully and completely internalizing the global warming externality. As was
previously indicated, I think that the formal WCA voting result of the model of this section of
the paper may perhaps be interpreted somewhat less formally as indicating that negotiating
a uniform national carbon price may have a desirable property that favors supplying a near-
optimal level of emissions. If the median marginal bene￿t (per capita) is close to the mean
marginal bene￿t (per capita), then the socially optimal carbon price has the property that
roughly half of the world￿ s population wants the price to be higher, while roughly the other
half of the world￿ s population wants the price to be lower. This might be interpreted as a
desirable feature even without the formal mechanism of majority-rule voting in the WCA.
6 Might a Modi￿ed Cap-and-Trade Work as Well?
Previously I listed three desirable features that instruments for negotiating climate change
should ideally possess: (1) cost e⁄ectiveness; (2) a natural one-dimensional focal point; (3)
a built-in self-enforcement mechanism that internalizes the externality. I then explained
that an internationally-harmonized but nationally-retained carbon price possesses all three
properties, whereas a n-dimensional quantity-based cap-and-trade system at best (if it can
be negotiated in the ￿rst place) possesses only the ￿rst property of cost e⁄ectiveness. With
n di⁄erent nations, there will be di¢ cult bargaining over n di⁄erent caps with no force other
than altruism countervailing each nation￿ s sel￿sh desire to be a free rider and secure for itself
a large cap on emissions.
But maybe I am being unfair to tradeable permits. Suppose we imagine trying to convert
the n-dimensional problem of allocating carbon emissions permits into some one-dimensional
quantity analogue of a uniform price on carbon emissions. We might imagine a thought
experiment where the cap-and-trade negotiators are sitting around a negotiating table and
14limiting themselves to simple linear formulas for allocating individual emissions caps.
Suppose the cap-and-trade negotiators must decide the total amount of emissions and
the allocation of emissions permits for each nation. A standard way of conceptualizing this
allocation problem for each country is in terms of an assigned fractional emissions reduction
from an assigned baseline level. In this paper I think it is most instructive to view the
essence of such an assignment process in terms of its simplest linear reduced form.
Let Y be the worldwide total output of emissions. Suppose country j is assigned emis-
sions permits according to the reduced-form linear speci￿cation
Y
j(Y ) = ￿
j Y + ￿
j; (23)
where Y j is the emissions cap assigned to country j, while ￿
j > 0 and ￿j are some ￿xed
distributional coe¢ cients representing j￿ s assignment fraction, with the balancing properties
n X
j=1
￿
j = 1 (24)
and
n X
j=1
￿
j = 0: (25)
If each nation would accept as given the assigned distributional coe¢ cients f￿
j;￿jg and
the formula (23), one might then imagine negotiating over (or even voting for) the total
emissions Y . Contingent upon f￿
j;￿jg being accepted as given, this system seemingly
possesses the desirable property of having a one-dimensional locus of negotiations (here Y ).
And there is also countervailing force against negotiating for a high value of Y . Although
j￿ s automatic assignment of a high emissions target Y j when Y is high (via (23) with ￿
j > 0)
helps j directly by lowering its emissions costs, this domestic e⁄ect is counteracted by the
bene￿ts that j would lose from high Y because then everyone else would also emit more.
It appears that such a cap-and-trade system could in principle have desirable focal-point
and countervailing-force properties if the assigned coe¢ cients f￿
j;￿jg were accepted and
bargaining were restricted to negotiating total emissions Y:
But now follow the thought experiment further by asking : Where do the distributional
coe¢ cients f￿
j;￿jg come from in the ￿rst place? They are presumably the result of a
n-party negotiating process where there is no countervailing force to the sel￿sh desire of
country j to make its own ￿
j and ￿j as high as possible. With n di⁄erent nations, there
will be the usual di¢ cult bargaining over n di⁄erent distributional coe¢ cients f￿
j;￿jg, with
no externality-internalizing incentive countervailing each nation￿ s desire to secure for itself
15a high fraction of emissions ￿again presumably resulting in a Kyoto-like breakdown.
When a cap-and-trade system is used to control pollution within a nation, the government
of that nation assigns the caps analogous to Y j (or the fractions analogous to ￿
j and ￿j).8
In this intra-national case there is a natural symmetry between a one-dimensional price p
and a one-dimensional total quantity Y . But there is no international government that has
the unilateral power to assign caps or fractions. These caps or fractions must be negotiated
among sovereign nations. This breaks the one-dimensional symmetry because now one price
p is contrasted with the asymmetry of n vested sovereign interests jockeying for the n initial
distributions of the form fY jg or f￿
j;￿jg. There is thus a critical distinction between intra-
national and inter-national cap-and-trade systems. In the international case the initial
distribution of caps is explicitly distributive, resulting in a war of words about who caused
the global-warming problem and who should bear the burden of remedying it, who is rich
and who is poor, what is fair and what is unfair, and so forth and so on.
But perhaps a formulation of this generality is biased against cap-and-trade. We might
try to imbue the f￿
j;￿jg with dimensionality-reducing salient qualities by imagining ￿natu-
rally symmetric￿focal allocations of f￿
j;￿jg. One such seemingly symmetric formula might
be that each country is assigned the same fractional reduction of emissions from some agreed-
upon baseline year. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 adopted just a little of the spirit of this
idea for developed countries alone, with the hope that some variant of it might later be ex-
tended to developing countries. The high-income industrialized countries (Annex I) agreed
to ￿binding￿ commitments (but without any enforcement mechanism!) to reduce green-
house gas emissions in 2012 by an average of 5% relative to 1990 levels (although allowing
some individually-negotiated variations around that 5% average). Developing countries
were exempt from any ￿binding￿commitments. Overall, the Kyoto Protocol did not come
close to ful￿lling its initial aspirations. The U.S. and Australia did not ratify, Canada and
Japan eventually dropped out, and individual compliance was at best spotty.9 Further-
more, and perhaps most distressingly, non-Annex I countries have not agreed to any actual
future ￿binding￿commitments going forward from 2012. The Kyoto experience is subject
to multiple interpretations. For me, it largely testi￿es to the great di¢ culty of negotiating
binding international quantity caps on the major emitters. In the language of (23), it has
been overwhelmingly problematic to assign binding quantity-like distributional coe¢ cients
8Admittedly, this is often done in a way that eases special-interest acceptance, such as being allocated
for free or almost for free based on something like a uniform reduction of previous pollution levels.
9The one bright spot might be considered the European Union, whose emissions trading system could
perhaps be interpreted as evolving towards an EU-wide cap (declining annually) with member-state shares
increasingly being determined by auctioning permits. I am unsure and somewhat skeptical about the extent
to which this EU model might be extended to the world as a whole. For a generally favorable assessment
of this possibility, see Ellerman (2010).
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j;￿jg on a worldwide basis.
Other seemingly symmetric quantity formulas might also be examined. For example, one
might entertain the idea of assigning the same worldwide emissions level per capita. This is
a symmetric formula that embodies a certain concept of worldwide fairness, but a cap-and-
trade system based on such an initial distribution of caps would involve massive transfers from
the developed to the developing countries, which would likely prove politically unacceptable.
Besides, even this formula does not address concerns regarding historical responsibility for
the cumulative stock of emissions, which would surely be raised. Alternatively, one might
imagine negotiating (or even voting on) an identical percentage reduction from some base
case of emissions. In this situation, I think, everyone would ￿rst argue about the fairness
of the baseline emissions that they were initially assigned.
I abstain from further speculation. My point is that no matter what quantity-like initial
allocation mechanism I can imagine, an attempt to modify an international cap-and-trade
system by making it one dimensional seems likely to founder for essentially the same reasons
that an unmodi￿ed international cap-and-trade system founders. In a quantity-based system
with n di⁄erent sovereign nations I fear there will be intractable negotiations for n di⁄erent
distributional assignments, with no force countervailing each nation￿ s free-riding desire to
secure for itself a sel￿shly lenient emissions fraction.10
Here is what I think is the essence of the one-price vs. n-quantities negotiation problem as
elaborated in this section. A quantity-type system based on a formula like (23) involves two
layers of negotiations. First, the n parties must agree on the n quantity-like distributional
coe¢ cients f￿
j;￿jg. Then, second, the parties must agree on the single aggregate level
of Y . By contrast, a price-based system involves only one layer of negotiation, focused
on agreeing to a single one-dimensional uniform price p. This latter is not an easy task,
but it makes sense to me that it is generally easier to negotiate one price layer than two
quantity layers (whose ￿rst layer involves assigning n quantity-like distributional coe¢ cients
f￿
j;￿jg). Admittedly this argument depends upon a particular way of framing the issue,
but it seems to me that, in international negotiations among n sovereign nations, there may
be an irreducible asymmetry between one price instrument vs. n quantity instruments.
Even while acknowledging that it only involves one layer of negotiations (as opposed to
two on the quantity side), one could ask on the price side what might induce n countries to
agree to a single harmonized charge for carbon emissions. We have been over this ground
before. It all begins with the recognition that any resolution of the global warming free-rider
problem requires a collective commitment to some binding restriction on the sovereign right
10Bosetti and Frankel (2012) propose a constructive and imaginative allocation formula for emissions
permits, but it still looks complicated and contentious to me.
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their own sovereignty by collectively committing to a common price regime for resolving
the global warming externality? Perhaps because enough of them come to realize (or are
made to realize) that the international climate-change public good is su¢ ciently important
to outweigh national rights to pollute the global commons ￿and that a radical collective
problem may call for a radical collective solution-framework. Without such a realization and
the will to act upon it, progress on resolving the global warming externality will be limited
to voluntary altruism, which seems not nearly enough to overcome the free rider problem.
At the end of the day, there is no airtight logic in favor of a negotiated price over
negotiated quantities, only a series of partial arguments. One argument is that the revenues
from a carbon price are nationally collected, so that the contentious distributional side is
somewhat hidden and there is at least the appearance of fairness as measured by equality
of e⁄ort. A second desirable feature, I have argued, is the natural salience and relatively
low transaction costs of negotiating one price as against negotiating n quantities, which,
while somewhat imprecise, is in my opinion an important distinction. A third argument is
the self-enforcement mechanism that constitutes the main theme of this paper, namely the
built-in countervailing force of an imposed uniform price of carbon, which tends to internalize
the externality and gives national negotiators an incentive to o⁄set their natural impulse to
otherwise bargain for low tax rates for themselves.
Of necessity, this paper has been sprinkled with subjective judgements. This, unfor-
tunately, is the nature of the subject. To repeat yet again, this time after examining
somewhat more carefully the alternatives, I judge it di¢ cult to escape the conclusion that,
in the context of an international treaty that covers all major emitters, it is more politically
acceptable and it comes closer to a social optimum to negotiate one binding price than n
binding quantities or quantity-like distributional coe¢ cients.
7 Concluding Remarks
The model of this paper is so abstract and so removed from reality that it is open to enormous
amounts of criticism on many di⁄erent levels. There are so many potential complaints that it
would be incongruous to list them all and attempt to address them one by one. These many
potential criticisms notwithstanding, I believe the model here is exposing a fundamental
countervailing-force argument that deserves to be highlighted.
Because the model is at such a high level of theoretical abstraction, it has blurred the
distinction between a carbon price and a carbon tax. As was previously noted, the important
thing is acquiescence by each nation to a binding minimum price on carbon emissions, not
18the particular internal mechanism by which this obligation is met. A system of national
carbon taxes with revenues kept in the taxing country is a relatively simple and transparent
way to achieve harmonized carbon prices. But it is not necessary for the conclusions of
this paper. Nations or regions could meet the obligation of a minimum price on carbon
emissions by whatever internal mechanism they choose ￿a tax, a cap-and-trade system, a
hybrid system, or whatever else results in an observable price of carbon.11 And any nation
or region could choose to impose a carbon price above the international minimum. The hope
is that even a low positive initial value of a universal minimum carbon price could be useful
for gaining con￿dence and building trust in this price-based international architecture.
The purpose of this paper is primarily theoretical and exploratory. Any proposal to
resolve the global warming externality will face a seemingly overwhelming array of practical
administrative obstacles and will need to overcome powerful vested interests. That is the
nature of the global warming externality problem. The theory of this paper seems to
indicate that negotiating a uniform minimum price on carbon can have several desirable
properties, including, especially, helping to internalize the global warming externality. To
fully defend the relative ￿practicality￿of what I am proposing would probably require a book,
not an article. In any event, this article is not primarily about practical considerations of
international negotiations. I leave that important task mostly to others.12 However, I do
want to mention just a few real-world considerations that have been left out of the model
yet seem especially pertinent.
A binding international agreement on a uniform minimum carbon price presumably re-
quires some serious compliance mechanism. To begin with, the carbon price must be
observable. For enforcement, perhaps there is no practical alternative to using the inter-
national trading system for applying tari⁄-based penalties on imports from non-complying
nations in the form of border-tax adjustments. Cooper (2010) has argued for an expansive
interpretation whereby the internationally agreed charge on carbon emissions would be con-
sidered a cost of doing business, such that failure to pay the charge would be treated as a
subsidy that is subject to countervailing duties under existing provisions of the World Trade
Organization.13
An e¢ cient carbon price naturally produces more winners than losers by the modi￿ed
Pareto criterion. In the case of the global warming externality, which has been charac-
terized as the greatest public goods problem of all time, it seems reasonable to suppose
11A minimum carbon price could be attained in a cap-and-trade system by setting it as a ￿ oor, which
could be enforced, e.g., by making it a reserve price on the auctioning of permits.
12See, e.g., Bodansky (2010) or Barrett (2005).
13See also the discussion of the legality of such sanctions under WTO provisions in Metcalf and Weisbach
(2009).
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price. Because countries here get to keep their own carbon-price-generated revenues, then
welfare-compensating transfers, to the extent they are made at all, ought to be relatively
modest second-order deadweight-loss triangles instead of the relatively immodest ￿rst-order
rectangle transfers associated with tradeable permits.
Another practical issue I am waving aside is just where in the production chain a carbon
price should be collected. I think the presumption would be that the carbon price should be
collected by the country in which the carbon dioxide is actually released into the atmosphere.
One might try to argue that a carbon price should be collected downstream as close as
possible to the point where the carbon is burned. But this would involve an impractically
large number of collection points. It is much easier to collect the price upstream, at various
chokepoints where the carbon is ￿rst introduced into the carbon-burning economy.14
I close by noting again that global warming is an extremely serious as-yet-unresolved ex-
ternality problem. With the failure of a Kyoto-style quantity-based approach, the world has
seemingly given up on a comprehensive global design, settling instead for sporadic national,
sub-national, and regional measures. These partial measures seem far from constituting a
socially e¢ cient response to the global warming externality. Perhaps, as was previously
suggested, the Kyoto-style quantity-based focus on negotiating emissions caps embodies a
bad design ￿ aw. The model of this paper is indicating a way in which negotiating a binding
internationally-harmonized nationally-collected minimum price on carbon emissions might
help to internalize the global warming externality.
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